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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
ALLEN-HOWE SPECIALTIES CORP.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and
Appellant
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

vs.
U.S. CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
a corporation, JACOBS ENGINEERING,
a corporation, and WYOMING MINERAL
CORPORATION, a corporation,

case No. 16209

De fen dan ts and
Respondents

NATURE OF CASE
A subcontractor seeks recovery for alleged cost overruns
from the building owner, the project engineer and the general
contractor.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted by
the Honorable G. Hal Taylor presiding in the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, on five of plaintiff's
seven counts.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek to have the

summa~}

judgment entered

be low a f fi r:ned.
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Statement of Facts
COntractual Relations
Wyoming Mineral (•wyoming Mineral" or "OWner") contracted with

u.

S. Construction, Inc ("U. S. Construction") on

February 5, 1977 and with Jacobs Engineering Company ("Jacobs
Engineering•) on March 1, 1977 to erect the building which is
the aubject of this suit.

u.s.

Construction was to do the

concrete work and erect the building (R. 238, ex. P-52) and
Jacobs Engineering was assigned Wyoming Mineral's rights under
the U. S. Construction contract and was obligated, as the general
contractor, to "do all things" necessary to complete the uranium
extraction facility.

(R. 240, ex. D-84).

On April 11, 1977, plaintiff by and through its presider.
William

c.

Howe ("Howe"), signed a subcontract with

u. s.

Con-

struction for erection of the building on the Wyoming Mineral
property.

(R. 237, ex. D-6).

Plaintiff's work was described in

that subcontract as the "Erection only of one
building •

(1) Butler metal

" (R.237, ex. D-6, Section 2).

The compensation

to be paid plaintiff for that work was $53,372.00; with approved
extra compensation, U. S. Construction ultimately paid or tendere:
to plaintiff $64,193.65, of which $10,901.65 remains unpaid.
104-105).

As ~s apparent from those

allowed over $10,000.00 in
or~ginal

(R.

figures, plaintiff has been

add~tional

compensation from the

subcontract amount.

Relevant Contract

Prov~s~ons

Section 4
1n plaint1ff's

o~

':!"le subcontract ;:no\·ides tr.at an·; i.:1crease

compens3t!~~

be~~~sc

c~

1

:~3~~e

-··

~~e

~~~~~
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~us~

be agreed upon in writing prior to the work being performed.
That section specifically provides that "no increase or decrease
in the subcontract price shall be binding on the Contractor
unless agreed upon in writing."

(R. 237, ex. D-6).

Section 6 of the subcontract provides that if the
subcontractor is delayed by, or encounters interference from, the
contractor, owner or other subcontractors an extension of time
may be requested, but that the subcontractor is not:
. . . entitled to any increase in the Subcontract price or to damages or additional
compensation as a consequence of such delay
except to the extent that Contractor is
entitled to receive an increase in contract
price from the Owner.
(R.236, ex. D-6,
Section 6).
Under u.

s.

Construction's contract with Wyoming Mineral,

compensation for interference from the Owner was available only
under the following conditions:

9. Simultaneous Work B~ Others.
(a) . . . Any cla~m of the Contractor
arising out of any alleged interference due
to the conduct of such other work shall be
made to the Owner in writing within five
(5) days of the occurrence of the alleged
interference and shall be deemed to have been
waived unless so made.
(R.238, ex. D-52, General Conditions--A)
(Emphasis supplied).
Before signing the subcontract, Howe had read the
agreement and understood its terms.

(R. 236 at 34-37).

Howe was

aware that written authorization Kas required for extras, having

- 3-
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bad a claia for extraa denied by

u. s.

Construction on a previous

job under the same subcontract form because of that requirement.

(a.

231 at 8-9).

Nevertheless, Howe admitted a complete failure

on plaintiff's part to comply with the subcontract provision
~latin9

to approval of extras (R. 236 at 51):

Q. All right. And except for those
claims that have been made and payment
has either been made or tendered, all of
the other claims in your Complaint are
for monies for work services, materials
which were performed by you before you
submitted a claim for extra work and had
it approved by U. s. Construction?

A. Yes.
Even if plaintiff's claims are for interference, rather
than for extra work, it is clear from a review of the invoices
submitted by plaintiff that none were timely submitted.

(R. 237,

ex. D-9, 0-10, D-11, o-12, o-21, o-22, D-23 and D-24).

Each of

those invoices was submitted more than five days after the cause
of the alleged interference, making it impossible for

u.

S.

Construction to obtain increased compensation by forwarding the
invoices to Wyoming Mineral and thereby rendering compensation for
the plaintiff under the subcontract impossible.
General Conditions--A,

(R.23B, ex.

D-52,

~9).

Plaintiff's Re uests for Additional Com ensation and Acce tance
o Payment ~n Full
Plaintiff commenced work at the job site on June 20,
1977, and soon thereafter submitted to l'. S. Construction ar.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
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invoice dated June 29, 1977, for "back-charges•, totalling $4,660.00,
including charges through June 24, 1977.

(R. 236, ex. D-9).

of the items on that request were approved by
and the rest were denied.

u. s.

TWo

Oon•truction

(R. 236 at 55). On July 19, 1977,

o. s.

Construction tendered to plaintiff a "Waiver of Lien" (R. 237, ex.
D-7) acknowledging full satisfaction and release of all claims for
all materials supplied and work performed to that date and a check
in the amount of $1,400.00 (R. 237, ex D-8) with an endorsement
similar to the Waiver of Lien.

The "Waiver of Lien" and check

were both signed, unaltered, by an employee of plaintiff.

(R. 236

at 52-53}.
Plaintiff submitted an invoice to

u. s.

Construction for

additional compensation dated July 28, 1977, for $6,560.11.
237, ex. D-10).

(R.

With the exception of two items, authorization

for extra compensation for the items listed in that invoice, was
neither requested nor approved in writing before the work was
performed.

(R. 236 at 58-59).

The invoice related to compen-

sation for work rendered through July 15, 1977; the invoice is
dated thirteen days later, on July 28, 1977.

(R. 237, ex. D-10).

On August 8, 1977, plaintiff again submitted an invoice to U. S.
Construction for "Extra time (men & equipment rentals) caused by
interferences of other trades, equipment and structures . . . •
claiming compensation totaling $6,632.64.

(R. 237, ex. D-11).

The invoice related to interference during the month of July, and
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...

tba~fo~

•ubmitted eight days after the last interference to
1
wbicb the invoice related.
(R.237, ex. D-11) •

On Auqu8t 10, 1977, U. S. Construction delivered to
plaintiff a check with a restrictive endorsement acknowledging
full •ati•faction and release of all claims for services performed

and ..terial• •upplied to that date.

The check indicated that was

payment for both the regular progress payment and "Payment of
IXtra work at Wyoming Mineral per invoices."

The check was

accogpanied by a •waiver of Lien" form containing in substance the

•aae

language as the check endorsement.

(R. 237, ex. D-13 & 14).

Howe picked up the check and the Waiver of Lien form

from U. S. Construction's office, altered the check endorsement to
indicate that rather than a full, there would be only a partial
release.

(R. 236 at 63-66).

Howe personally took the check to

U. S. Construction's bank, altered the endorsement language and
demanded a cashier's check in return.

(R. 236 at 68-69).

Howe

has admitted that, despite all of the conjecture contained in
plaintiff's brief, he did not obtain authorization for the alterat:
in the check from any employee of

u. s. Construction.

(R.

236 at

66):

On August 8, 1977, plaintiff also requested a novation, or
renegotiation of the subcontracts.
(R. 237, ex. D-12).
That
request was in two parts:
( 1) a request for extra compensation
through July 19, 1977, totaling $19,892.75 which, with the
exceptions noted above, was neither timely nor approved; (2) an
additional request of $35,173.00 in excess of the subcontract
through completion of the job. The request was rejected.
(R
236 at 61-62).
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Q.
All right. Did you talk to personally
any employee of u. s. Construction Company
to attempt to obtain authority to strike
and interline the endorsement of the check
shown on Exhibit D-14?

A.

No, I did not.

Howe followed that same procedure with two subsequent checks.
(R. 237, ex. D-15, D-30; R. 235 at 70 and 94).
Plaintiff submitted various requests for extras, dated
August 29 and 31 and September 6, 1977, all of which were denied.
(R. 237, ex. D-21 through 24; R. 236 at 87).

The date of each of

those invoices was more than five days after the alleged interference to which it related.

Despite this ongoing dispute as to

the amount owed, on September 7, 1977, Howe picked up another

u.

check from

S. Construction and again altered the endorsement.

(R. 237, ex. 15: R. 236 at 79-80).
On October 11, 1977, Howe obtained another check from U.
S. Construction, this time from its president (R.237, ex. D-30; R.
236 at 92).

Howe did not request permission to interline changes

in the endorsement, though he again did so.

(R. 236 at 93).

Subsequently. on November 3, 1977, a check, accompanied by a
letter, was tendered to plaintiff, conditioned on acceptance as
final payment (R.237, ex. D-31 & 32); plaintiff refused that
conditional tender.

(R.237, ex. D-33).
ARGUMENT

I.

NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS

Plaintiff correctly cites Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules
of

Civil Procedure as the standard under which the trial court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-7Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.

ruled and pursuant to which this court must review the trial
court's judgment.

The trial court here had before it facts

wbich, when examined in light of the applicable legal doctrines,
established the defendants' right to judgment as a matter of law.
That determination should be upheld.
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court's judgment was
t.proper because issues existed as to material facts.
bowev.r, are simple.

The facts,

A dispute existed as the amounts owed under

the subcontract, plaintiff accepted checks as payment in full and
is now precluded from seeking more by accord and satisfaction.
Bven without the accord and satisfaction, plaintiff's failure to
comply with subcontract terms bars additional compensation under
the subcontract.

Recovery in unjust enrichment is inappropriate

since there is an express contract under which the work was
performed and which provides for compensation for the plaintiff.
Foreclosure of plaintiff's mechanic's lien is inappropriate since the full subcontract amount has been paid.

Finally,

plaintiff's claim of breach of contract against Wyoming Mineral
and Jacobs Engineering is patently absurd since plaintiff has a
contract with neither of those parties.

Each of these bases for

the trial court's judgment must be examined and be presumed to
be a basis for its ruling judgment.

Green Witch

\~ater

Co. v.

Salt Lake City, 15 Utah 2d 224, 390 P.2d 586 (1964); and, Waters
v. Waters, 100 Utah 246, 113 P.2d 1038 (1941).

Moreover, the

trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants was fully
warranted in this case.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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II.

THE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION IS SUPPORTED BY
SUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION.
A.

THE AMOUNT OWED PLAINTIFF
UNDER ITS SUBCONTRACT IS
UNLIQUIDATED

On April 11, 1977, plaintiff entered a subcontract
under which it was to perform certain labor, fully described in
the subcontract, for $53,372.00.

(R.237, ex.D-6).

Soon after

plaintiff began performance under the subcontract, plaintiff
began to dispute the amount owed for performance of the subcontract
work.

Less than one month after the work was started, plaintiff

submitted an invoice for "back charges" totaling $4,660.00,
contending that the subcontract compensation should be increased
by that amount.

(R. 236, ex.D-9).

U. S. Construction disputed

that contention, on various grounds, and stated that only two of
the items on that request would pe paid.

(R. 236 at 55).

Throughout performance of its subcontract work, plaintiff
contended that it was entitled to extra compensation and

U. S.

Construction continued to allow some of plaintiff's claims,
disallow others, and to tender checks for amounts less than
plaintiff contended it was owed.

A review of all of the invoices

submitted by plaintiff, and the various responses by U. S. Construction, establish that there was never an agreed upon compensation, liquidated to the satisfaction of both parties, after
work was started by plaintiff.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for -9digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Despite the fact that there is but one subcontract
involvad, which provides for only one compensation, plaintiff
atteapts to sever its claims in order to argue lack of consideration.

s.

Plaintiff asserts that amounts which have been paid by

u.

construction were liquidated and therefore provide no consider-

ation for an accord and satisfaction of plaintiff's unpaid
claims, which plaintiff asserts are

~~liquidated.

Plaintiff

ignores one compelling, uncontroverted fact -- the present controversy involves one sum, the amount which plaintiff is entitled
to for work performed under one subcontract, which provides for
but one total compensation.

Plaintiff's claims for additional

compensation are valid only if such claims comply with the
subcontract.

If plaintiff is entitled to that additional com-

pensation, it is because the claims comply with the contract and
are, therefore, merely a portion of the total subcontract amount
due.
Plaintiff's liquidated-unliquidated distinction supposed:
deprives the accord and satisfaction found by the trial court of
consideration.

Plaintiff's contention is supported by neither

Utah law nor a rr.ajority of jurisdictions.

Further, plaintiff's

argument rests on the basic misconception that the amount due
~•der

the subcontract is severable into liquidated and unliqui-

dated claims.
Under Ut.3.h law, payment by a debtor of an amount less
than the creditor claims, where

t~e

amount O\ved is in dispute,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1S

a sufficient consideration for an accord and satisfaction.

As

stated by this court in Browning v. EqUitable Assur. Society, 94
Utah 532, 72 P. 2d 1060 (1937):
There must be consideration for [an accord
and satisfaction). Settlement of an unliquidated or disputed claim where the
parties are apart in good faith presents such
consideration.
In accord, Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., 18 Utah 2d
18€. 417 P.2d 761

(1966), and Tates, Inc. v. Little America

Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1975).

Under the present

uncontoverted facts, plaintiff claims compensation far in excess
of the amount which U.

s.

Construction contends is due.

Plaintiff's

compensation under the subcontract is therefore disputed:
A demand is necessarily either liquidated or
unliquidated.
A demand is not liquidated, or
undisputed, even if it appears that something
is due, unless it appears how much is due~
and when it is admitted that one of two
different sums is due, but there is a genuine
dispute as to which is the proper amount, the
demand is unliquidated, within the meaning of
that term as applied to accord and satisfaction.

It may be said that the reason for the rule
in such an instance is that a dispute as to a
part of the debt makes thP. whole debt a
disputed one so as to come within the general
rule that payment of part of an unliquidated
debt in full satisfaction thereof discharges
the entire debt.
Grindstaff v. North Richland Hills Corp., 343 S.W.2d 742, 745
(Tex. App. 1961).

See also, Dickson v. Stockman, 411 S.W.2d 610

(Tex. App. 1966); Paulsen Estate v.

~aches-Selah

Irr. Dist., 190
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wash. 205 67 P.2d 856 (1937)

1

Hutchinson v. Colbertson, 161 Pa.

Super. St. 519, 55 A.2d 567 (1947)

1

Hancock v. Johnson, 69 Wyo.

503, 2•• P.2d 285 (1952).
In its brief, plaintiff discussed cases from several
jurisdictions and concluded that those cases supported its argument.
cases.

Defendants will not discuss and distinguish all of those
Plaintiff's interpretation of those cases will effec-

tively destroy the central purpose of the doctrine of accord and
satisfaction -- the settlement of claims.

The opportunity for

~

accord and satisfaction arises where the parties cannot agree on
the amount due.

The debtor normally will not contend that

nothing is due, but rather admits that some amount is due and is
willing to tender that amount.

Plaintiff would seize on that

"admission," and conclude that if the debtor is willing to admit
a certain sum is due, that amount is liquidated and payment of
that amount will not constitute a consideration for an accord and
satisfaction.

According to this erroneous reasoning, whenever a

debtor is willing to pay what it believes is due, the sum is
liquidated, leaving an unliquidated sum to be litigated.

The

opportunity for an accord and satisfaction vanishes.
Plaintiff errs in assuming its argued for distinction
is a legal, as opposed to factual,

finding.

Situations can be

imagined where there is an undisputed sum paid, for example for
one parcel of goods, which is unrelated to a dispute over
parcel of goods.

This could negate the accord and was,

in
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fac~.

the factual setting of Dillman v. Massy-Ferguson, Inc., 13 Otab
2d 142, 369 P.2d 296 (1962), cited by plaintiff.

Such cases bave

no applicability to the facts before the trial court here.
[T)here is a dispute between the debtor and
the creditor as to the amount due, one claiming
that a certain sum is due and the other
claiming that another sum is the proper
amount, [so that) the demand is unliquidated,
within the meaning of that term as applied to
accord and satisfaction.
Paulsen Estate v. Naches-Selah Irr. Dist., 190 Wash. 205, 67
P.2d 856, 857 (1937).
If the Washington court adhered to plaintiff's argument
in the early Seattle R&S Ry. Co. v. Seattle-Tacoma Power Co., 63
wash. 639, 116 P.289 (1911), cited in plaintiff's brief, the rule
has apparently changed to that stated in the Paulson Estate case.
Although the Seattle R&S

Ry· Co. case has been cited subsequently

to the Paulsen Estate case, the cases in which it was cited are
significantly different.

In one, a debtor contended that payment

of a liquidated account constituted an accord and satisfaction of
a dispute which arose thereafter over another account.
Stram, 37 Wash.

2d 818, 226 P.2d 218 (1951).

Moyer v.

The other case

involved a debtor who tendered one-half of the amount he adwitted
was due and then alleged an accord and satisfaction.
Lumber Co. v. Petty, 9 Wash. App.

Field

378, 512 P.2d 764 (1973).

The claims which form the basis for the instant suit
are for one amount, the amount owed under the subcontract.
amount was in dispute.

That

Under such circumstances, the acceptance
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of an amount as payment in full of that unliquidated claim is an
accord and satisfaction supported by a valid consideration.
None of the Utah cases cited by plaintiff support its
contention.

The first, F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17

Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965), is totally inapposite, standing
for a proposition which defendants do not question.

That case

involved a debtor's contention that an accord and satisfaction
had resulted from partial payments on a promissory note.

The

debtor did not dispute the amount owed on the promissory note,
but contended that tender and acceptance of an amount less than
the liquidated amount owed on the note constituted an accord and
aatiefaction.

This court correctly found no consideration under

those circumstances noting, however, that:
It is true that the modern trend is to be
cautious about rigidly applying this rule and
that courts are generally somewhat indulgent
toward finding consideration somewhere in the
new arrangement, such that it was to settle a
dispute, or that there is some advantage to
the creditor in accepting the lesser amount,
where the unreasoning adherence to the rule
might result in inequity.
F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Vtah 2d 80 404 P.2d
670, 673

{1965).

The doctrine held applicable in the F.M.A. Financial
~case

is:
often said to have originated w1th the
decision by the House of Lords in Foakes v. Beer,
9 App. Cas. 60S (1884), to the effect that an
agreement by a [credi~or] ~o recei·:e 3 sum
less than the debt owed hi~ in full satisfact1on
of such debt is :1ot SL:ppor~ed :..;~- c :1Sl,dera.tion and is ::ot b1ndl!lO on <:~e ::!:e ::..:.or, <?':P:'.
after p3~·~ent o~ :.~e s~alle~ 3~ou~
b~· ~~~
debtor.
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H. L. "Brownie" Choate, Inc. v. Southland Drilling-Co., Inc., 441
s.W.2d 672, 675 (Tex. App. 1969).

Clearly the doctrine of

Foakes v. Beer is not applicable under the instant circumstances.
Both the F.M.A. Financial Corp. case, and the doctrine of Foakes
v. Beer upon which it is predicated, involve the payment of

Qft

amount less than the debt both parties agree is due and oving, an
amount liquidated through agreement of the parties.
Plaintiff also cited Tates, Inc. v. Little America
Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1975).

That case applied the

same doctrine dealt with in the F.M.A. Financial Corp. case and
is equally inapposite.

Furthermore, the holding in

with accord, not consideration.

~dealt

The trial court's conclusion

that there was an accord and satisfaction was reversed because it
was not clear that the check was tendered in full payment, not
because of lack of consideration.

In any event, the sentence

which follows the portion of.the case quoted by plaintiff illustrates that this Court does not adhere to archaic definitions of
consideration:
However, there may be varying circumstances
in which the debtor is induced by the
request of the creditor to make payment in
some manner other than he is obligated to
do; and if he is so induced, and thus suffers
some legal detriment in making the payment,
there is consideration for the promise and
the debt is discharged.
Tates,

Inc.

v.

Little America Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228, 1229

(Ctah 1975).
The two other Utah cases plaintiff cites in support of
1ts argument are equally inapposite.

Bennett v. Robinson's

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-15-

~cal

Mart, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966) and
~•ex

Dilt.An v.
(1962).

Ferguson, Inc., 13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d 296

In the Bennett case, the question was not whether there

waa conaideration for an accord and satisfaction, but rather
wbether there waa an accord, or agreement, at all.

The ruling,

.nd the lanquaqe quoted in plaintiff's brief, goes only to whether
there was an agreement between the parties.

The case neither

conaidered nor was relevant to plaintiff's present argument.
Neither does Dillman support plaintiff's position.
A9ain, the ruling went to whether there was an agreement between
the parties.

Involved were two separate parcels of parts.

One

parcel of parts was rejected, the other accepted and paid for by
the debtor.

The creditor contended that the claims were separable

and that a settlement as to one parcel had no effect on the
amount owed for the other parcel.

Under those circumstances, the

court ruled there was no accord and satisfaction because there
was no agreement that acceptance of the check as to one parcel of
parts related to the other parcel.

That holding is in no way

inconsistent with the summary judgment granted defendants in the
in3tant matter.
At several points in plaintiff's brief the uncontroverte:
facts are mischaracterized.

The most blatant is at p. 24-25

where it is stated that "U. S. Construction paid plaintiff only
part of what it admitted it owed, and gave plaintiff no consideration whatever for the compromise of the dLsputed part of plaint:'
claim."

This is directly contrary to t!-:e uncontroverted :acts ;:
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this case.

U.

s.

Construction paid plaintiff amounts which

u. s.

Construction contended constituted payment in full for amounts
owed on the subcontract.
in full.

At all times

Those payments were remitted as payment

u. s.

Construction paid the full amount it

admitted was due; never did it pay "only part• of what it admitted
was due. Further, U.S. Construction did pay plaintiff some of the
requested extra compensation.

2

Plaintiff has further embellished its argument with
quotations from a hornbook on commercial law and with
to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code.
accord and satisfaction as blackmail.

citati~ns

The intent is to characterize
Plaintiff admits that

those provisions are not binding under the instant transaction.
Even so, plaintiff misstated the appropriate law under the Utah
Uniform Commercial Code which explicitly recognizes the right to
settle disputed claims without consideration, Utah Code Ann.
§70A-l-107:
Any claim or right ar~s~ng out of an alleged
breach can be discharged in whole or in part
without consideration of a written waiver or
renunciation signed or delivered by the
aggrieved party.
The lower courts holding is fully supported by the
uncontroverted facts and the law.
B.

EVEN ACCEPTING PLAINTIFF'S UNLIQUIDATED - LIQUIDATED DISTINCTION, A
VALID CONSIDERATION EXISTED FOR AN
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.

See eg. R 237, ex. D-14 a chPck paid to plaintiff which states
on its face that i~ includes payment for extras.
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Bven accepting plaintiff's artificial distinction, which

bu nev.r been applied by this court and which is factually inappli

Gable

in this case, a valid consideration exists under the instant

facts for an accord and satisfaction.

The only question is

wbetber there is a •sufficient" consideration to support a

contra~

lufficient consideration is present where there is:
Any benefit to the promissor, or loss or
detriment to the promissee, is a sufficient
consideration to support a simple contract.
Williams v. Peterson, 86 Utah 526, 46 P.2d 674, 678 (1935).

s..

also, Utah Nat. Bank of Salt Lake City v. Nelson, 38 Utah

169, 111 P. 907 (1910).
U. S. Construction paid amounts which it believed were
due the plaintiff, rather than withholding payment until there
was an agreement as to the amounts due.

Plaintiff's request for

compensation in excess of the subcontract was essentially a
rejection of that contract and could have been so treated by U.

s.

Construction.

Instead,

u.

S. Construction continued to pay

compensation according to its interpretation of the contract.
Certainly, such payments constitute a detriment to U. S. Construction.
Plaintiff received immediate payment pursuant to the
subcontract, though plaintiff was at the same time contending
that compensation above the subcontract amount was due.
certainly benefited from that immediate payment.

Plaintiff

Further, plainti:

has been paid or tendered over $10,000 compensation in excess of
the original subcontract amount.

U. S. Construction has paid

not only the subcontract amount, but has in an effort to comproml'
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plaintiff's claims, approved appropriately made claiaa.

an

numerous occasions the courts have, when faced with plaintiff••
argument that payment of an undisputed amount cannot act u
consideration for an accord and satisfaction of both the diapute4
and undisputed amount, rejected that theory.
Illustrative is Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber CO. of C&l.,
37 C.2d 592, 234 P.2d 16 (1951).

The creditor argued there wu

no consideration because the debtor paid only the conceded
amount of an indebtedness.

The court's response to that arguaent

is based on sound theories of consideration:
But that circumstance would not prevent
an accord and satisfaction arising from
acceptance of the conditionally offered
remittances applicable to the entire
demand. While there is some conflict in
the authorities on whether the payment
of the conceded part of the claim is a
good accord and satisfaction if received
in discharge of the whole • • • it is
the majority view, as well as the
"tendency of the later cases," to "sustain
the discharge where there is a dispute
as to any part of the claim made by the
creditor, although the payment is only
the smaller amount which was conceded by
the debtor to be due. "
The court went on to quote from Robertson v. Robertson, 34 Cal.
App.2d 113, 93 P.2d 175, 178 (1939):
The consideration for the tender and
acceptance of each check in a less
amount was the determination of dispute,
and the extinction of obligation in
relation to each monthly payment so
made.
Potter v. Pac. Coast Lumber Co. of Cal., 37 C.2d 592, 234 P.2d
16,21-22 (1951).

In accord, Mall Tool Co. v. Poulan, 40 So.2d
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512 (La. App. 1949): Schnierle v. Schnierle, 33 Ohio Law Abs.
674, 33 N.B.2d 674 (1949): and Hutchinson v. Culbertson, 161
Pa. Super. Ct. 519, 55 A.2d 567 (1947).
Put aimply, to argue the lack of consideration for
the accord and satisfaction in this case ignores the realities
of that concept and the uncontroverted facts.

Though Plaintiff

characterizes the transactions as commercial blackmail, it
cannot be seriously contended to be any more so than any other
compromiae of a claim.
not be held to

~

Plaintiff's complaint is that it sDould

accord and satisfaction because to do so will

injure its present ability to assert claims.

Such is the

nature of contracts -- parties bargain away rights in return
for some benefit.

Here the benefit was immediate payment and

a settlement of the dispute. Further, plaintiff has been paid or
tendered over $10,000 in excess of the subcontract amount.

Cer-

tainly, sufficient consideration exists for an accord and satisfaction.

III.

THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS ESTABLISH
AN ACCORD.

Plaintiff contends that whether an employee of U.S.
Construction was aware of the plaintiff's disagreement with the
check endorsement form, and therefore assented to plaintiff's
alteration, presents a genuine issue of material fact.

Plain-

tiff's brief is misleading as to the uncontroverted facts on
this point.
A total of four checks
struct1on to

pla1nt1f~

~ere

and cashed by

~endered

by

~.S.

Con-

pla~nti~f.
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o-8, D-14, D-15, and D-30).

No alteration was made in the

endorsement to the first check (R.237, ex. 0-8) and it was
signed by Denise H. Wood, an employee of plaintiff authorized
to sign checks.

(R.236 at 53).

Tendered with the first check

was a Waiver of Lien form, releasing all claims for work
performed through June 30, 1977.
cashing of that check

~onstitutes

Regardless of whether the
an accord and satisfaction as

to work performed before that first check, certainly plaintiff
does not contest the validity of a signed lien waiver.

See

e.g., Holbrook v. Webster's Inc., 7 Utah 2d 148, 320 P.2d 661
(1958); and, LeGrand Johnson Const. Co. v. Kennedy, 541 P.2d
1038

(Utah 1975).

Plaintiff waived its right to assert a lien,

or seek additional compensation for, work performed prior to
June 30, 1977.
The real controversy revolves around the second,
third and fourth checks.

Plaintiff's brief mischaracterizes

the uncontroverted facts surrounding the tender and cashing of
those three checks.

Howe, plaintiff's president, was personally

involved in picking up and cashing each of those checks.
testified extensively about the procedures followed.

He

Plaintiff's

brief deals extensively with the possibility that Patricia
Platts knew of plaintiff's disagreement with the clerk's restrictive
endorsement language.

The record supports no such contention.

When Howe picked up the second check from U. S.
Construction's office he signed the Waiver of Lien form "in
cront of Pat [Platts]".

(R. 236 at 64).

Howe signed that docu-
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.ant after having interlineated changes in its substantive
language (R.236 at 63).

As to the check, dated August 9, 1977,

lowe neither obtained, nor sought, authority to change the
endoraement language of the check.

(R. 236 at 66).

In fact,

lowe made the change to the check waiver language after having
left the U.S. Construction office.

(R.236 at 66).

Howe handled the third check, dated September 7,
1977, in a similar manner.

Again, Howe neither sought nor

obtained authority to change the endorsement on the check.
236 at 70).

(R.

Similarly, on the fourth check, dated October 11,

1977 Howe neither sought nor obtained authorization to change
the endorsement on the check.

(R. 236 at 92-93).

Howe followed

the same procedure with both those checks as with the first,
making the changes after having left
office.

u.

S. Construction's

(R.236 at 70,94).
The uncontroverted facts before the trial court, and

before this court, conclusively establish that plaintiff's
disagreement with the endorsement language on the check was never
brought to U. S. Construction's attention.

Instead, in every

case Howe would take the check and interlineated changes to the
check endorsement form only after having left the U. S. Construct::
office.

No expression of dissatisfaction with the check endorse-

ment was ever made by Howe.

Plaintiffs reliance upon Howe's

changes to the Waiver of Lien form are misplaced; u. S. Construction places no reliance upon the Walver of Lien forms
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af~er

the first one, which was signed in an unaltered form.

Plaintiff'•

objections to the Waiver of Lien forms are irrelevant to the
endorsement language on the checks.
Essentially, plaintiff seeks to protect its interest
through having made, unilaterally and in secret, interlineation•
to the check endorsement form.

This it clearly cannot do.

As

stated in Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., 18 Utah 2d
186, 417 P. 2d 761, 764

(1966):

We have no disagreement with the proposition generally that where there is a
dispute about a claim and one party
makes an offer of settlement which is
accepted and performed by the other that
constitutes an accord and satisfaction.
The required "meeting of minds", which plaintiff contends is
lacking, is merely the acceptance and performance of the accord:
A subjective "meeting of the minds" is
not required, as the creditors acceptance of the check may be evidenced
actually or by implication. (Citations
omitted)
Further, it is almost universally held that "[t) he cashing of the
check or its certification is sufficient
in act of dominion to constitute such
acceptance."
Teledyne Mid-American Corp. v. HOH Corp., 486 F.2d 987, 993,
(9th Cir. 1973).
In each instance, Plaintiff retained and immediately
cashed the conditionally tendered check.

Plaintiff's acceptance

of the checks as payment in full is evidenced by Howe's cashing
of the checks with knowledge of the terms accompanying the
check; altering those terms without notice to U. S. Construction
:.:; of no effect, Vance •;. Hammer, 105 Ariz. 317, 464 P.2d 340,
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Upon analysis, however, these cases hold that
vhere a payment of a particular amount is
offered as payment in full, it can only be
accepted according to the terms under which
it ia offered.
The offeree cannot change the
term& of the otter by disregarding or changing
the language of the instrument of payment.

!!! !!!2•

Reatatement of Contracts S420 (1932); Hutchinson v.

CUlbertaon, 161 Pa. Super. 519, 55 A.2d 567 (1947); Potter v.
Pacific Coast Lumber Co. of Cal., 37 C.2d 592, 234 P.2d 16
and, Novack v. Casual Craft, Inc., 88 N.E. 2d 334, 336

(1951):

(Ill.

1949).
The supposedly disputed facts plaintiff cites at page 33

ot its brief are irrelevant.

U. S. Construction tendered checks

conditioned on acceptance as full payment.

Plaintiff did not

object to the terms of endorsement, nor obtain authority to change
those terms, from any U.

s.

Construction employee.

Plaintiff cites no case that U.

s.

Construction would

be on constructive notice of the altered terms of the endorsement

after the first check was altered.

Plaintiff does not cite any

cases for the proposition that where endorsement terms are altered
without a debtors knowledge that alteration will be binding on the
debtor.

The accord and satisfaction was complete upon plaintiff's

acceptance of the terms of the offer by cashing the checks.

3

Plaintiff's citation of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code
will not be dealt with in detail.
Suffice it to sav that
presumed reasonable time goes only to the ability of 3. depositor
to assert cla1ms against its bank and was certainly not meant to
express any un1form legislati'.·e ir1tent 3.S to reasonable time.
By plaintiff's own admiss1.on that sect1.on does :10t gc•:ern th<=
instant fact.
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IV.

THE CONDITION ON WHICH THE CHECKS
WERE TENDERED IS CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE.

Plaintiff extensively cites case law for the proposition that the terms of an accord must be clear and unmistakable
on the check.

Defendants have no dispute with that general

proposition.
The endorsement on the checks involved in this case is
unmistakably clear:
Endorsement of this check acknowledges
payment in full for all labor and/or
materials and/or equipment furnished to
date by payee and any subcontractors
thereof toward construction and improvements on the property described on the
face of this instrument and the undersigned hereby waives all lien rights in
respect to such labor and/or materials
and/or equipment heretofore performed or
furnished, and the undersigned payee
further acknowledges and guarantees that
this payment is in full satisfaction of
all labor, laborers and suppliers of
labor and/or materials of said premises
performed prior to this date and shall
hold the payor harmless against any
claims for labor or materials so furnished.
Payee further acknowledges and
warrants that the labor or material for
which payment is received hereby was
actually performed or furnished by the
person or persons receiving payment
therefore.
This instrument may not be negotiated
until dated and signed by payee(s).
(R. 237, Exhibit D-8).

It is hard to imagine how it could be

made more clear to a creditor that by signing the check it is
'.-Jai ving all claims and accepting that check as full payment.
?laintiff's

~resident

apparently found the language clear
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enou9h that he felt compelled to alter the language to protect
plaintiff'• intere•ts.
The endorsement on the U.

s.

Construction checks

con•titute• exactly the type of "unmistakable communication"
which the Utah court has required.

Each check contained not

only the above language, but also typed terms on its face.
Thouqh the plaintiff characterizes those typed terms as confusing, it is clear that those terms state exactly what the
check constitutes payment for.
~15

(See eg. R. 237, ex. D-7, Dl4,

and D-30).
Where, as here, a check is clearly tendered as payment

in full of all claims these terms are inconsistent with retention
under any other circumstance.

Where the condition is clear, a

creditor's options are clear:

the check must be accepted as

full payment or returned.

Potter v. Pac. Coast Lumber Co. of

Cal., 37 C.2d 592, 234 P.2d 16 (1951).

As stated in Grindstaff v.

North Richland Hills Corp,. 343 S.W.2d 742, 744
1961).

(Tex. App.

"The acceptance would be tortious unless the debtor's

terms are assented to, and the creditor is not allowed to
assert that he is a tort-feasor, when his acceptance can be
given an effect involving no legal wrong."

Plaintiff should

not, by arguing the need for technical language in the endorsement, be able to benefit from dealing with the check in a
manner directly contrary to the endorsement thereon.
Plaintiff's argument is not really that the check
endorsement is unclear, but that particular lanouage . ,as not
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used.

The argument seeks to impose technical language as a

prerequisite to an accord and satisfaction.

To impose such

artificial requirements is inconsistent with the purpose of
that doctrine and has not been applied by this Court.
Illustrative is Reliable Fum. Co. v. American Rome
Assur. Co., 24 Utah 2d 93, 466 P.2d 368 (1970) where the check
tendered in settlement of a claim was marked simply •payment in
full."

The trial court had granted the debtor's motion for a

directed verdict and that judgment was affirmed by this Court.
No rigid rule was applied to the endorsement language.

Instead,

the totality of the circumstances were examined:
We note our accord with the cases cited and
relied upon by plaintiff to the effect that
the fact that there was a notation of "payment in full" on the check does not necessarily
settle the obligations between the parties.
This is true in curcumstances where that does
not appear to be the fact.
However, it is
one of the factors to be considered in the
total picture.
Reliable Furn. Co. v. American Home Assur. Co., 24 Utah 2d 93,
466 P. 2d 368, 370 (1970).

The "total picture" under the uncon-

troverted facts in this case is that not only was the clerk
clearly tendered as payment in full, but that Howe so understood
the endorsement and therefore unilaterally changed the endorsement.
Plaintiff cites Hintze v. Seaich, 20 Utah 2d 275, 437
P.2d 202

(1968) and Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, Inc.,

560 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1977)

for the proposition that for a check

endorsement to be effective in an accord and satisfaction it must
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contain language stating not only that it is tendered in full
par-ent, but also that if it is not so accepted it should be
returned.
Moreover, for the reasons stated above, such a technical
rule should not be applied. Furthermore, both of those cases are
distinguishable.
of ca.missions.

The Hintze case involved payment to a salesman
The court examined not only the endorsement

language but also other circumstances involving the tender of the
check.

The authorities cited in Hintze stand only for the require·

mant that it be clear that the check is tendered as full payment:
In 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Accord and Satisfaction
SlS, it is said: • . .
"In order that the acceptance of the
check or remittance shall operate as a full
discharge, the condition that it is to be
accepted in full satisfaction of the pending
claim or obligation must be expressly made."
In Hudson v. Yonkers Fruit Co., a New York
Court of Appeals case, found at 258 N.Y.,
168, 179 N.E. 373, 80 ALR 1052, it is said:
Two forms of accord and satisfaction of
unliquidated claims are to be discovered in
the books . . . The other is where the tender
of the payment has been coupled with a condition whereby the use of the money will be
wrongful if the condition is ignored.
Hintze v. Seaich, 20 Utah 2d 275,

437 P.2d 202, 207

(1968).

Any

requirement of particular language in the Hintze case should be
attributed to the facts before the court.
The holding in the Cannon case was that the

credi~ors

were unaware of any dispute when the checks were received.
holding was merely that the endorsement dld not put the

That

c~editor
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on notice of any dispute.

There was no similar confusion as to

the existence of a dispute or as to the terms under which the
instant checks were tendered.
V.

PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM ADDITIONAL
COMPENSATION BY THE CONTRACT TERMS AND
ITS FAILURE TO COMPLY TBERENITB.

Plaintiff's Count II alleges that "Pursuant to its
contract with

u.s.

Construction, Inc., together with extras,

plaintiff performed labor and furnished materials in the amount
of $128,302.42 of which amount U.

s.

Construction, Inc. has paid

only $52,292.00 leaving a balance due of $75,010.42."

The

subcontract provides for compensation of only $53,372.00.

Though

the Complaint states that the additional compensation is for
extras, the invoices submitted by plaintiff make it clear that
the real dispute centers on interference from other trades.
Under the subcontract, plaintiff was to erect a Butler building.
Plaintiff did no more than was required under this subcontract,
the erection of a Butler building, and therefore performed no
"extra" work:
Extra work as used in connection with a
building contract means work arising outside
of and entirely independent of the contract
something not required in its performance,
not contemplated by the parties, and not
controlled by the contract.
C.F. Bolster Co. v. J. c. Bospflug Const. Co., 167 C.A. 2d 143,
334 P.2d 247,

252

(1959).

The subcontract provision dealing with extra work
states that:
-29- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Section 4 • • • • Any increase or decrease
In the sUbcontract price resulting from such
changes shall be agreed upon in writing by
the parties hereto. No increase or decrease
in the Subcontract price shall be binding
on the contractor unless agreed upon in
writing.
Contract provision limiting the right to recovery for extra work
or interference are valid in Utah.

Western Eng., Inc. v. Utah,

20 Utah 2d 294, 437 P.2d 216 (1968): and, Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. Hartford Ace. Indem. Co., 98 Utah 297, 95
P.2d 736 (1939).

Plaintiff never received approval in advance

for extra work for which the agreed compensation has not been
paid or tendered.

(R.236 at 51).

The subcontract terms do not

provide that the subcontractor is entitled to extra compensation
for extra work to the extent that the Contractor is entitled to
additional compensation from the Owner.
A of the

u.

The General Conditions--

S. Construction Wyoming Mineral Contract are there-

fore inapplicable to extra work.

However, even assuming that the

provision quoted by Plaintiff from the General Conditions - A is
applicable here, it provides plaintiff with no relief.

The

relevant portion of that provision is:
6. (c)
• Should the Owner or the Architect
at any time make any interpretation of any of
the contract documents, submit any additional
drawings, refuse to approve any of the Contractors shop drawings or require any change in
the same as a condition precedent to the
approval thereof, or issue any other direction
which, although not so identified by the
Owner, is considered by the Contractor to be
an order making a change in the work, the
Contractor shall within five (51 davs after
its notice of such dlrection, submit to the
Owner a written request for the issuance of 3
written change order. (R.23S, ex.D-521
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Under the uncontroverted facts in the present situatiae,
none of the invoices from plaintiff to

u.

S. Construction related

to items which had taken place within five days.
circumstances, it would have been impossible for

Under such

u. s.

Construction

to have transmitted the request for written change orders to the
owner within the requisite five days under section 6(c) of the
General Conditions - A.
Plaintiff's argument for compensation for interference
from other trades is similarly forclosed.

First, its Complaint

seeks compensation for extras, not for interference.

Second,

Paragraph 6 of the subcontract provides that the subcontractor is
entitled to compensation only to the extent to which U. S. Construction is entitled compensation from the owner.

For U. S.

Construction to receive compensation from the OWner it must
comply with Section 9(a) of the General Conditions--A to the
u.

s.

Construction/Wyoming Mineral Contract.

(R.238, ex. D-52).

s.

Construction related

to items performed within five days thereof.

(R.237, ex. D-9, D-

None of the invoices from plaintiff to U.

10, D-11, D-12, D-22, D-23 and D-24).

Each of those invoices

were submitted more than five days after the interference to
which it related.

Under such circumstances, each of plaintiff's

claims were, in effect, stale when made and U. S. Construction
would not be able to comply with the terms of its contract with
Wyoming Mineral.

u. s. Construction was entitled to no compensa-

tion and therefore, under the applicable contract provisions
cited by plaintiff, neither was plaintiff.
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VI.

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT
IS UNWARRANTED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Plaintiff's Count VI alleges unjust enrichment against
all defendants.

Plaintiff does not dispute the validity of the

aubcontract entered with

u. s.

Construction.

That subcontract

provides the performance required and the manner in which additional labor will be compensated, if at all.

Defendants were

entitled to summary judgment on that count under the uncontroverted facts.
The one uncontroverted fact which compels that conclusion is that plaintiff entered a contract to construct a Butler
building and in that contract was contained all information
necessary to fully inform plaintiff of the performance required.
Plaintiff did no more than to construct the Butler building.
Plaintiff may not now seek recovery outside of its lawful,
binding contract.
The terms of the subcontract between U. S. Construction
and the plaintiff are clear, calling for the construction of one
Butler building, setting out certain of the components involved
and incorporating by reference all of the plans and specifications
of the prime contract between U. S. Construction and Wyoming
Mineral.

Where the contract terms are clear no further evidence

is necessary, as was recognized in Jaye Smith Const. v. Bd. of
Ed., Granite School Dist. 560 P.2d 320,

323 (Utah 1977)

The contract was clear and unambiguous, and
the court should not have permitted any
evidence of what the intentions of plaintiff
were when it made its bid.
The material
thing is what did the parties intend when
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they signed the contract? The answer to that
is clear -- they intended that plaintiff
construct the building according to the plans
and specifications and for the defendant to
pay the sum of $164,022.00.
Plaintiff seeks to circumvent the clear obligation created by the
subcontract through the equitable action of unjust enrichment.
There is, however, no equity in attempting to avoid one's lawful
obligation through an action in unjust enrichment.
This was recognized in the Jaye Smith case where the
plaintiff was a contractor who had submitted a bid to the defendant.
Included in the envelope containing the bid was a note qualifying,
on a certain contingency, the terms of the bid.

This qualifying

note went unnoticed when the contract was awarded to plaintiff as
the low bidder.

This court quoted language from the testimony of

the president of the construction company to the effect that he
had read the contract and understood its terms.
pres~dent

Similarly, the

of plaintiff in the instant action read and understood

the terms of the subcontract.

(R.236 at 33-38).

The Jaye Smith

case has its analog under the facts of the instant case.

The Utah

Supreme Court's answer to the contractor's claim of unjust enrichment in Jaye Smith is therefore particularly cogent:
Since when have courts rewritten contracts in
order to enhance the profits of one of the
parties thereto or to prevent loss to the
other? There is no unjust enrichment to one
who compels the other part to live up to his
agreement. (560 P.2d at 323).
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a..

also, commercial Fixtures '

P.24 773, 774 (Utah 1977)

Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 564
when an express agreement

(".

exists one may not be implied.")
Those cases are consistent with well-settled principles
of contract law that unjust enrichment does not allow plaintiff to
recover in excess of its contract. See eg., SA Corbin on Contracts,
Slll4.

This rule is set out in the Restatement of Restitution,

Sl07 (1936):
(1)
A person of full capacity who, pursuant to a contract with another, has performed
services or transferred property to the other
or otherwise has conferred a benefit upon him,
is not entitled to compensation therefore other
than in accordance with the terms of such bargain,
unless the transaction is rescinded for fraud,
mistake, duress, undue influence or illegality,
or unless the other has failed to perform his part
of the bargain.
Recovery in excess of its contract is what plaintiff here seeks.
The Jaye Smith case is, however, the answer to plaintiff's
contention.

Unjust enrichment is not an appropriate remedy where

the parties have voluntarily sought to govern their relationship
with a contract.
VII.

ADDITIONAL GROUNDS FOR THE TRIAL
COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The lower court's grant of judgment to defendants was
based on extensive memoranda from both the defendants and the
plaintiff.

Defendants argued for judgment on each count on

several bases.

Each such bases must be presumed to be a ground

for the lower court's judgment. See eg., Green lhtc!l ;·,'ater Co. '-'·
Salt Lake Citv, 15 Cta!l 2d 2:24,

390 P.2d

~36

.l'lG-l'i.

PLl::.ntl:':'s
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brief to this Court has not challenged several of those theories.
Defendants will briefly restate those which plaintiff has overlooked.
A.

Foreclosure of Mechanics Lien

As to Count I,

(foreclosure of mechanics lien) Wyoming

Mineral is entitled to judgment because the lien is restricted to
the amount of the subcontract, and payment of all sums due under
the subcontract have been paid or tendered.
Plaintiff is a subcontractor of U.S. Construction.
That subcontract provides that plaintiff was to receive $53,372.00
as compensation for the erection of a building.

The subcontract

prLce was subject to increase only pursuant to the subcontract
terms and those terms were not complied with in requesting additional compensation.

The subcontract price has been paid or

tendered.
This Court's interpretation of the mechanic's lien
statute establishes that a subcontractor may not increase the
compensation to which it is entitled through the filing of a
mechanic's lien in excess of the amount provided for in its
subcontract.

In Sierra Nevada Lumber Co. v. Whitmore, 24 Utah

131, 138, 66 ?. 779
ture's]

(1901), the court held that "[The legisla-

intention was to secure in such cases to a subcontractor

under a subcontract made in good faith a lien for the subcontract
price, within the limit of the original contract price."
B.

Interference with Plaintiff's Work

Finally, judgment on Count V (interference with plain~:~~·s

work)

ln favor of Wyoming Mineral and Jacobs Engineering
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waa

proper.

Plaintiff contracted only with

(a.237, ex. D-6).

u.s.

Construction.

In its brief plaintiff states that Count Vis

a breach of contract action against Wyoming Mineral and Jacobs
Jnqineerinq.

(Brief of Appellant, p.S).

Plaintiff's brief does

not, however, go on to explain how a person can allege breach of
contract by parties with whom it has no contract.

Under the

uncontroverted facts, where plaintiff has a contract with neither
~ominq

Mineral nor

u.s.

Construction, judgment against plaintiff

on its Count V was proper.
CONCLUSION
The grant of summary judgment for all defendants on
Counts I, II, IV, V and VI was proper based on the uncontroverted
facts before the lower court.

The accord and satisfaction found

by the lower court was based upon a sufficient consideration.
The "factual" issues which plaintiff presses in its brief are
either irrelevant under the doctrine of accord and satisfaction
or directly contrary to the uncontroverted facts in this case.
The lower court's judgment is also appropriately based
on the subcontract.

Plaintiff's claims for compensation were all

submitted too late.

Judgment

priate.

for

equally appro-

The lower courts judgment

of and for
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